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INTRODUCTION

John Doe and Richard Smith sued their insurance company, Mutual of Omaha, for disability discrimination' in violation of Title III of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 Sadly, Doe and Smith suffered from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and they
claimed that the terms of their insurance policies discriminated
against them based on their affliction with AIDS.3 The insurance policies Doe and Smith held with Mutual of Omaha limited recoverable
benefits for the treatment of AIDS or AIDS-related conditions (ARCs)
4
to a lifetime maximum of $100,000 for Doe and $25,000 for Smith.
However, each policy provided for a relatively generous
5
$1,000,000 in benefits for medical care not relating to AIDS or ARCs.
Additionally, for medical conditions not relating to AIDS or ARCs,
Mutual would reinstate the $1,000,000 maximum benefit and pay out
additional claims after the original million dollar limit had been
reached, provided that the policy holder did not incur any expenses
for two consecutive years. 6 Thus, under Mutual's policies, people with
AIDS could spend up to $25,000 or $100,000 to treat their illness,
while people without AIDS could spend up to $1,000,000 to treat their
illnesses.
In this suit, Doe and Smith alleged specifically that the benefits
caps on the treatment of AIDS or ARCs violated the ADA's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability because the caps denied Doe and Smith the opportunity to participate in and benefit
from the $1,000,000 limit and potential reinstatement of benefits af7
forded to policy holders who do not suffer from AIDS. Mutual of
Omaha moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a claim
1 See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1998),
rev'd, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 845 (2000). Doe and Smith

also alleged that Mutual of Omaha violated the Illinois Insurance Code, but this Comment focuses only on the discrimination claim under the ADA.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182-189 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
3 See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191.

4 See id. at 1190.
5 Seeid.
6 See id.
7 See id. at 1191. At trial, Mutual stipulated that it "has not shown and cannot
show that its AIDS Caps are or ever have been consistent with sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience, bona fide risk classification, or state
law." Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,

120 S. Ct. 845 (2000).
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upon which relief could be granted,8 thus putting to the district court
the resolution of three distinct issues.9
First, the claim presented the court with the novel issue of
whether Title III of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability, applies to the content of insurance policies and not
just to access to insurance policies. Second, the district court had to
determine whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act,10 which prohibits the
construction of any federal law so as to interfere with any state law
enacted to regulate the business of insurance, precludes application
of the ADA to insurance policies." Finally, the district court addressed the issue of whether AIDS caps constitute disability discrimination at all, or whether the caps "are a permissible distinction in the
level of benefits provided to one category of disability as differentiated
2
from other categories."'
The district court held that (1) Title III of the ADA does extend
to the content of insurance policies,' 3 (2) the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not bar application of the ADA to insurance policies, 14 and (3)
the AIDS caps do not present a matter of differentiating between categories of disabilities, but of "singling out ...individuals with a particular disability, AIDS, for inferior coverage as compared to that afforded
non-disabled individuals." 15 Thus, the district court held that Doe
and Smith had stated a viable claim that the AIDS caps in their policies with Mutual of Omaha violated Title Im of the ADA by discrimi16
nating against them on the basis of their disability.
On appeal, 17 a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that Title I0I of the ADA did not apply to the content of insurance policies because "section 302 (a) does not require a seller to alter
his product to make it equally valuable to the disabled and to the
8 See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1190.
9 For the purposes of its motion to dismiss, Mutual of Omaha assumed that
asymptomatic HIV infection constituted a disability. See id. at 1191 n.2. The Supreme
Court has since held that infection with HIV is an impairment "from the moment of

infection," Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 627 (1998), making it "apparent" by the
time the Seventh Circuit decided Doe "that both ARC and AIDS are disabilities," Doe,
179 F.3d at 558.

10 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-15 (1994).
11 See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1195.
12
13

Id. at 1195-96.
See id at 1194.

14
15
16
17

See id. at 1196.
Id.
See id. at 1196-97.
See Doe 179 F.3d at 557.
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nondisabled, even if the product is insurance.' u 8 Even if it did, the
court continued, the suit would be barred by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.19

The resolution of the first two issues in favor of Mutual rendered
moot the third issue addressed by the district court-whether the
AIDS caps constituted disability discrimination. Thus, the appellate
court need not have addressed it. However, the court addressed one
example of the way in which the AIDS caps would apparently discriminate against the disabled. If a policy holder infected with HIV were to
contract pneumonia as a result of the person's infection, the cost of
treating the pneumonia would be subject to the AIDS caps because
the caps applied to AIDS-related conditions. Thus, if the HIV-infected
person's medical expenses had already reached the maximum allowed
under the cap, the policy would not cover the cost of treating the
pneumonia. Yet, if a policy holder not infected with HIV were to contract pneumonia, the costs of treating that person's pneumonia would
be fully covered. 20 Therefore, as the circuit court noted, "[i]t
looks... like a difference in treatment referable solely to the fact that
one person is disabled and the other not."2 ' However, the court
found this conclusion to be in error because an illness like pneumonia is far more lethal to a person with AIDS than to a person without,
"[w]hich means they are not really the same disease." 22 Thus, the
court rejected the district court's conclusion on this issue as well.
This Comment considers each of the three issues addressed by
the district court in turn and their treatment in the Seventh Circuit. It
suggests that Title III of the ADA does prevent discrimination in the
content of insurance policies, that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not bar application of Title III to insurance policies, and that Mutual's
AIDS/ARCs cap discriminates against persons with AIDS by denying
them the same consideration it affords non-disabled persons in the
determination of their policy limits.

18
19
20
21
22

Id. at 563.
See id.
See id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 561.
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DOES TrrLE III OF THE ADA APPLY TO THE CONTENT OF
INSURANCE POLICIES?

A.

The District Court

The district court in Doe found that Title III of the ADA does
apply to the content of insurance policies. The court based its conclusion on its analysis of the plain language of the anti-discrimination
provisions of the ADA, the legislative history of the ADA, and the interpretive guidance offered by the Department of Justice (DOJ).23
Section 302 (a) of the ADA states the general rule prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations. The section reads,
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
24
operates a place of public accommodation.
Mutual argued that the plain language of the statute dictates that Title
I "regulates only access to goods and services offered by places of
public accommodation, [and not] the content of the goods and services themselves. '25 According to this view, Doe's and Smith's claim
should have failed regardless of whether the content of the policies
discriminated against individuals with AIDS because Doe and Smith
23 See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191-94.
24 Americans with Disabilities Act § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). The
DOJ regulations implementing Title III define "place of public accommodation" as "a
facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within
at least one of [12 specified categories]." 28 C.F.1. § 36.104 (1996). This definition
"incorporates the 12 categories of facilities represented in the statutory definition of
public accommodation in section 301(7) of the ADA." Id. pt. 36, app. B, at 603
(1996). Section 301(7) of the ADA includes "insurance office" in its list of "private
entities that are considered public accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (F)
(1994). The DOJ's regulations define "public accommodation" as "a private entity
that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 28
C.F.R. § 36.104. The term "public accommodation" as used in the DOJ's regulations
corresponds to the term "person" employed by Title III of the ADA. Id. pt. 36, app. B,
at 606. Title III prohibits discrimination "by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
Thus, an insurance company, as the "person" who owns, leases, or operates an insurance office, falls under the purview of the ADA and may not discriminate against an
individual on the basis of disability. Mutual of Omaha did not contest that it was a
"person" who owned and operated a place of public accommodation for the purposes
of Title III. Mutual merely asserted that the ADA applied only to a disabled person's
right of access to insurance, and not to the content of insurance policies themselves.
See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191.
25 Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191 (emphasis added).
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enjoyed equal access to the same insurance policies available to any
26
other individual whether disabled or not.

However, the district court in Doe could find nothing in the plain
language of the anti-discrimination provisions of Title III that indi27
cated that the scope of Title III "is limited to questions of access."
Instead, the court asserted that four sections of Title III, the general
rule quoted above2 8 and the three general prohibitions that follow it
in the statute, 29 belied such a narrow conclusion.3 0 The court did not
elaborate but went on to reach the rather summary conclusion that
"Title III is patently concerned with more than just access to the goods
and services offered by places of public accommodation."3 1 The court
concluded that the plain language of the statute "manifests a Congressional intent to ensure 'full and equal enjoyment' of the goods and
services themselves" 32 and not just access to them. Given the abbreviated nature of the district court's analysis, a closer look at the language of the relevant provisions and their application to the present
case is warranted. This Comment addresses those provisions below in
33
its analysis of the Seventh Circuit's opinion.
The district court found further support for its conclusion (that
the ADA applies to the content of insurance policies) in the legislative
history of the ADA. The court cited House and Senate reports that,
according to the court, "acknowledge [] the applicability of the ADA's
anti-discrimination provisions to insurance policies."3 4 The court
quoted the following language from a House report:
[W]hile a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk would be allowed under [section 501 (c) of the
ADA], the plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to
insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to
an individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage solely
because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial
principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated
35
experience.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 1193.
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
29 See id. § 12182(b) (1) (A) (i)-(iii).
30 See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1193.
31 Id.
32 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
33 See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
34 Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1193.
35 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.G.C.A.N. 267, 419-20.)
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Indeed, Mutual stipulated that it "has not shown and cannot show that
its AIDS Caps are or ever have been consistent with sound actuarial
principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience, bona fide risk
36
classification, or state law."
The Senate Report cited by the district court notes that it did not
intend the provisions of the ADA to affect the way insurance companies do business in accordance with the state laws and regulations
under which they are regulated. It continues with language quoted in
Doe:
Virtually all states prohibit unfair discrimination among persons of
the same class and equal expectation of life. The ADA adopts this
prohibition of discrimination. Under the ADA, a person with a disability cannot be denied insurance or be subject to different terms or
conditions of insurance based on disability alone, if the disability
37
does not pose increased risks.
Hence, the district court noted that Congress intended the ADA to
38
apply to the content of insurance policies.

Finally, the court in Doe found persuasive support for its conclusion that Title III applies to the content of insurance policies in the
regulations promulgated by the DOJ to implement Title 1I. 9 According to the passage quoted by the district court, the DOJ concluded
"that Congress intended [the ADA] to reach insurance practices by
prohibiting differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance offered by public accommodations unless the differences are
justified." 40 The court also cited the Title II Technical Assistance Manual4 ' issued by the DOJ, 42 which states, "Insurance offices are places
36 Doe 179 F.3d at 558. Risk classification is an actuarial technique used to estimate the future costs associated with an individual's claim based on that individual's
risk characteristics-such as age, weight, or presence of a disability-that have a
causal or statistical link to the risk that the insurance company is measuring. See H.
Miriam Farber, Subertfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-Provided
Health Care Plans Violate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 866
(1994);Jill L. Schultz, Note, The Impact of Title I1I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct on
Employer-ProvidedInsurancePlans:Is the Insurance Company Subject to Liability2, 56 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 343, 353 (1999).
37 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84 (1989).
38 See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1194.
39 See id. Congress "delegated to the DOJ the authority to promulgate binding
regulations" to implement Title III. Id.. at 1194 n.6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b)
(1994)).
40 28 C.F.R- pt. 36, app. B at 619 (1996).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c) (3) (1994). Congress delegated to the DOJ the authority to issue a technical assistance manual to provide guidance concerning the
ADA's requirements. See id.
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of public accommodation and, as such, may not discriminate on the
basis of disability in the sale of insurance contracts or in the terms or
43
conditions of the insurance contracts they offer."
Thus, the court concluded that in light of the plain language of
Title III, the legislative history of the ADA, and the DOJ's interpretative guidance, Title III of the ADA regulates not merely access to Mutual's insurance policies, but the content of the policies as well. The
court further noted that in reaching its conclusion it "joins a growing
number of district courts across the nation that have found Title III's
44
scope to encompass review of the substance of insurance polices."
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly heavy weight of authority supporting the district court's conclusion, the Seventh Circuit reversed.
B.

The Court of Appeals

The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel reviewing the case
framed the issue of whether the ADA applied to the content of insurance policies in terms of whether the ADA required a seller to alter its
product to make it equally valuable to disabled individuals and nondisabled individuals alike. 4 5 The court noted, "[I]t is apparent that a
store is not required to alter its inventory in order to stock goods such
46
as Braille books that are especially designed for disabled people."
The court conceded, however, that such a conclusion becomes "apparent" through interpretation of the statute and not through a simple reading. 47 In fact, the court stated that a simple reading of the
48
statute would suggest the opposite conclusion for the present case,
and so, the court reasoned, "the case cannot be resolved by reference
42

See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1194.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Civ. RrS. DIV., THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABIrTIEs ACT:
TrrLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § III-3.11000, at 19 (1993) [hereinafter

43 U.S.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL].

44 Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1194 (citing Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,
994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1998), Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp.
1158, 1163-65 (E.D. Va. 1997), World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1207-08
(N.D. Ga. 1997), Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 301-02 (N.D. Cal.
1997), Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425-26 (D.N.H. 1996),
Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996), Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 779 (E.D. Tex. 1996), and Baker
v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430, *3 (N.D. Ill. 1995)).
45 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 559-60.
46 Id. at 559 (citing Lenox v. Healthwise of Ky., Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir.
1998), and 28 C.F.R. § 36.307 (1996)).
47 See id. at 559-60.
48 See id. at 560.
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simply to the language of section 302 (a)."49 Thus, the court bypassed
the plain language of the ADA and looked instead to the "common
sense of the statute,"50 which, according to the court, suggests that the
ADA does not regulate the content of the goods and services offered
by a place of public accommodation. 5 1
The following syllogism describes the court's rationale. First, a
store is not required to alter its inventory in order to stock goods specially designed for disabled people. 52 Second, an insurance company
is a store and its policies constitute its inventory. Therefore, an insurance company is not required to alter its insurance policies to accom53
modate the disabled.
However, the court's reasoning here is flawed. Whether the ADA
may compel a public accommodation to alter its inventory is not relevant to the determination of whether the ADA applies to the content
of insurance policies. This is so for two reasons. First, the major
premise grounding the court's syllogism should only apply to the furnishing of tangible goods and not to services like insurance policies.
Second, the analogy the court draws between insurance companiesfaced with having to eliminate discriminatory terms from their policies-and retail stores-faced with having to alter their inventory to
include special goods-fails to accurately describe the scenario
presented by Doe.
1. Title III Does Not Compel the Alteration of Inventories (of
Tangible Goods)
The appellate court in Doe noted that "[a] camera store may not
refuse to sell cameras to a disabled person, but it is not required to
stock cameras specially designed for such persons."54 This is unquestionably the case when a retail store supplies goods of a tangible nature.5 5 However, as this Comment shows, the rule should not apply to
the provision of insurance policies. The circuit court in Doe decided
that the rule cannot be confined merely to the furnishing of tangible
goods, "since section 302(a) [of the ADA] is not limited to physical
products, but includes contracts and other intangibles." 56 However,
the rule excusing public accommodations from having to alter their
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 559.
See id. at 559, 563.
Id. at 560.
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a) (1996); id. pt. 36, app. B, at 630-31.
Doe 179 F.3d at 560.
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inventories derives not from section 302(a) but from § 36.307 of the
DOJ's regulations. 57 That section is limited to physical products. Section 36.307 establishes that the ADA "does not require a public accommodation to alter its inventory to include accessible or special
goods" designed to accommodate the disabled. 58 Though the regulations do not explicitly limit the application of this rule to the furnishing of tangible goods, analysis of the regulations suggests this result.
First, all of the examples of "accessible or special goods" 59 listed
in § 36.307 are of a tangible nature. According to § 36.307(c), "accessible or special goods include items such as Brailled versions of books,
books on audio cassettes, closed-captioned video tapes, special sizes of
60
lines of clothing, and special foods to meet particular dietary needs."
Nowhere in § 36.307 does the DOJ indicate that the section applies to
services of a non-tangible nature such as insurance policies.
Second, after limiting the duty of public accommodations to
serve the disabled by prohibiting compulsory inventory alterations,
§ 36.307 goes on to impose on public accommodations the obligation
of ordering, at the request of an individual with a disability, accessible
or special goods that it does not maintain in its stock. 61 A public accommodation must order the goods if the public accommodation
makes special orders for unstocked goods in the course of its regular
business and if the requested goods can be obtained from a supplier
with whom the public accommodation does regular business. 62 Such
a rule is clearly unsuitable in the context of insurance policies. An
insurance company does not order insurance policies from other suppliers. If § 36.307 were to apply to insurance companies, they could
be required to "order" policies accommodating to individuals with disabilities. Certainly neither Mutual nor the Seventh Circuit contemplated such a result, nor was it the intention of the DOJ's regulations.
Finally, the regulations containing the rule regarding inventory
alteration also contain examples of public accommodations that provide services of a non-physical nature. These public accommodations
are treated separately in the DOJ's regulations and the same rules do
not apply. 63 Significantly, the regulations specifically address the case
57

See 28 C.F.R. § 36.307; see also Doe, 179 F.3d at 559 (citing § 36.307). Congress

delegated to the DOJ the authority to promulgate binding regulations to implement
Tire III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186 (1994).

58
59
60
61
62

28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a).
Id.
Id. § 36.307(c).
See id. § 36.307(b).
See id.

63

See id. § 36.306 (1996).
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of a medical specialist and provide for the specialist's right to refuse to
treat a disorder that is not within his specialty and to refer the prospective patient to another physician. 64 A psychiatrist, as the court in
Doe noted, 65 may refuse to treat schizophrenia if the psychiatrist does
not specialize in the disorder. However, because the regulations contain a separate section dealing explicitly with medical specialists, the
rules provided in § 36.307 pertaining to the alteration of inventories
would not govern a medical provider's refusal to treat a certain disorder. The regulations also contain a section specifically addressing the
application of the ADA to insurance. 66 That section simply restates
section 501 (c) of the Act and does not provide for the limitation imposed by § 36.307. Thus, because the regulations cover insurancelike medical specialists-in a separate section, then by analogy, the
rule provided in § 36.307 should not govern insurance policies. The
court, therefore, should resolve the question of whether Tite III applies to the content of insurance policies by reference to the provisions relating specifically to insurance and not by analogy to other
inapplicable provisions.
2.

The Flawed Analogy

Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis of the regulations
promulgated by the DOJ, the appellate court's reasoning is flawed in
that the analogy on which it is based simply fails to accurately describe
the scenario presented by Doe. The appellate court in Doe reasoned
that the ADA does not require Mutual to remove the AIDS caps from
its insurance policies because the ADA does not require a public accommodation, like a bookstore, to alter its inventory so as to include
special goods, like Braille books, in order to accommodate individuals
with disabilities. 67 However, as Circuit Judge Terence Evans pointed
out in his dissent, the majority's analogy "misses the mark."68 A bookstore has an inventory of books, none of which are suitable to blind
people because the bookstore does not stock Braille books. However,
a bookstore presumably has no specific policy limiting a blind person's access to goods that it provides to other non-disabled customers.
It simply does not supply the needed goods to any customers.
In contrast, Mutual does have a policy limiting a disabled person's access to a service it provides to other non-disabled customers64
65
66
67
68

See id. § 36.302(b) (2) (1996).
See Doe, 179 F.3d at 560.
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (1996).
See Doe, 179 F.3d at 559-60.
Id. at 565 (Evans, J., dissenting).
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the $1,000,000 limit on benefits. Mutual does not totally restrict such
access, for, as the majority opinion points out,69 policy holders with
AIDS can draw from the $1,000,000 limit for medical treatment unrelated to AIDS or ARCs.70 Nevertheless, as the majority opinion made
clear, "[a]n insurance policy is a product, and a policy with a $25,000
limit is a different product from one with a $1 million limit, just as a
wheelchair is a different product from an armchair." 71 The proper
analogy, therefore, is not of a bookstore faced with having to include
Braille books in its inventory, but of a bookstore limiting access by
disabled customers to books of a certain genre or by a particular author specifically because the customers are disabled. 72 Thus, the analogies employed by the appellate court are inapposite to the facts
presented by Doe and do not help to resolve the question of whether
the ADA applies to the content of insurance policies.
The appellate court concluded that reference to the plain language of the statute could not resolve the issue of whether the ADA
applies to the content of insurance policies because a simple reading
of the statute could not lead one to the rule establishing that the ADA
cannot require a public accommodation to alter its inventory. 73 However, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, whether the ADA may
compel a public accommodation to alter its inventory is not relevant
to the determination of whether the ADA applies to the content of
insurance policies. Thus, to resolve the issue presented by Doe, this
Comment turns again to the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, and the interpretative guidance of the DOJ.
C.

The Plain Language, Legislative History, and Interpretative Guidance

Nothing in the plain language of the ADA suggests that the Act
should apply only to questions concerning access to goods and services
offered by public accommodations. In fact, as the court of appeals in
Doe conceded, 7 4 the language of the statute suggests just the opposite
result-that the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA apply to the
69 See id. at 558.
70 However, Mutual does limit access to the $1,000,000 limit, and as a result "the
policies have less value to persons with AIDS than they would have to persons with
other, equally expensive diseases or disabilities." Id. at 559.
71 Doe, 179 F.3d at 560; accord Boots v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., No.
l:98CV625JM, 1999 WL 1191425, at *4 (D.N.H. June 30, 1999).
72 See Schultz, supra note 36, at 380; see also Doe 179 F.3d. at 565 (Evans, J., dissenting) ("The better analogy would be that of a store which lets disabled customers in
the door, but then refuses to sell them anything but inferior cameras.").
73 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.
74 See id. at 560.
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content of goods and services as well. Two provisions in particular suggest this result in their use of the words "full and equal enjoyment."75
The general rule prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations is contained in section 302(a) of the ADA.7 6 The rule provides that the owner or operator of a "place of public
accommodation" may not discriminate against an individual "on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods [or]
services" 77 offered by that place of public accommodation. 78 The key
words here are "in the full and equal enjoyment" of goods or services.
Section 302(b) identifies specific forms of discrimination prohibited
by section 302 (a).79 According to section 302 (b) (2) (A) (i), it would
be discriminatory, and thus in violation of the Act, to impose or apply
"eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual
with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully
and equally enjoying any goods [or] services unless such criteria can
be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods [or] services
being offered."8 0 Here again, the key words are "fully and equally enjoying" the goods or services.
The provisions do not explicitly apply to the content of insurance
policies. However, nothing in those words suggests that the anti-discrimination provisions should apply only to questions of access, for
plainly, before one can enjoy goods or services, one must first gain
access to them.8 ' Moreover, as Doe and Smith argued, to construe
the provisions as regulating only access to goods and services would
render meaningless the words "full and equal enjoyment."8 2 It is difficult to imagine how Doe and Smith could be said to have "fully and
equally enjoy[ed]" the benefits of their insurance policies when, for
the treatment of their illness, they had to rely on a sum of money that
was ten to forty times less than the sum of money on which persons
without AIDS could rely for the treatment of their illnesses. Yet, if the
ADA regulates only access to goods and services, then Mutual's policies did not violate the Act, inasmuch as Mutual does not refuse to sell
its insurance policies to persons with AIDS, and Doe and Smith must
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b) (2) (A) (i) (1994).
76 SeeAmericans with Disabilities Act § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). This
section is quoted in full in the text accompanying supra note 24.

77 Id.
78 For an explanation of how insurance companies are considered public accommodations for the purposes of Title III, see supra note 24.
79 See Americans with Disabilities Act § 302(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (1994).
80 § 302(b)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b).
81 SeeDoe, 999 F. Supp. at 1191.
82 Id.
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be seen as fully and equally enjoying the benefits of their insurance
policies. Thus, interpreting the statute to apply only to questions of
access and not to the content of insurance policies renders meaningless the words "full and equal enjoyment."
However, whether such an interpretation would render those
words meaningless depends on the meaning attributed to those words
by the ADA. The statute itself offers no definition, but the regulations
promulgated by the DOJ to implement the statute do: "Full and equal
enjoyment means the right to participate and to have an equal opportunity to obtain the same results as others to the extent possible with
such accommodations as may be required by the Act and these regulations."8 3 Thus, sections 302 (a) and 302 (b) (2) (A) (i) would guarantee
a disabled person's right both to participate in an insurance policy-that is to have access to that good or service- and to have an equal
opportunity to obtain the same results. Whether a disabled person
who holds an insurance policy has the opportunity to obtain the same
results depends on the terms of the disabled person's policy. Thus,
because the "full and equal enjoyment" of goods and services includes
the right to have an equal opportunity in obtaining the same results as
the non-disabled, the Act must regulate the content of insurance
policies.
Significantly, however, "full and equal enjoymenC promises equal
opportunity to achieve the same results only "to the extent possible
with such accommodations as may be required by the Act and [the
DOJ's] regulations."8 4 The "accommodations" to which the regulations refer here are concessions made to the public accommodations
regulated by Title III-that is, they are limitations on Title III's antidiscrimination provisions. Therefore, it is only to the extent possible
with such limitations on the Act that the ADA regulates the content of
insurance policies. Thus, the question becomes, do the DOJ's regulations or the Act itself require any limitations on the ADA's anti-discrimination provisions that would allow Mutual to place policy caps on
AIDS benefits? The answer, as indicated by the DOJ's regulations, its
interpretative guidance, and the legislative history of the ADA, is yes.
Mutual may limit coverage for the treatment of AIDS or ARCs,
provided, however, that the limitations are based on sound actuarial
principles or actual or reasonably anticipated experience. Section
83 28 G.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 609 (1996). As the court in Doe noted, see Doe, 179
F.3d at 563 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998)), the DOJ's regulations are entitled to Chevron deference, which asks "whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
84 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 609.
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501 (c) (1) of the ADA provides that the Act "shall not be construed to
prohibit or restrict... an insurer... from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law," provided, however, that such practices are not
"used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of'Title mI.85 The House
Judiciary Committee explained that this section was added "because
[the Committee] does not intend for the ADA to affect legitimate classification of risks in insurance plans in accordance with the state laws
and regulations under which such plans are regulated."8 6 The report
continues,
Specifically, Section 501(c) (1) makes it clear that insurers may continue to sell to and underwrite individuals applying for life, health,
or other insurance on an individually underwritten basis, or to service such insurance products, so long as the standardsused are based on
87
sound actuarialdata and not on speculation.

In language quoted by the district court in Doe,88 the legislative history
further clarifies that the requirement that public accommodations
base their insurance practices on sound actuarial principles extends to
the terms and conditions of insurance policies.
Moreover, while a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based
on classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the
plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or
limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an individua or

charge a different rate for the same coverage solely because of physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or
rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related
89
to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.
85 Americans with Disabilities Act § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (1994).
Some scholars have suggested that Section 501 (c) may shield insurance companies
from all liability. See Monica E. McFadden, InsuranceBenefits Under the ADA: Discrimination or Business as Usual?, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 480, 481 (1993); Schultz, supra note
36, at 347-48. However, this does not seem to be the case, as section 501 (c) limits its
own scope to those practices not used to evade the purposes of the Act. See Schultz,
supra note 36, at 347-48; see also infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
86 H.L REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 445,
493. The House Committee on Education and Labor offered a similar explanation,
see id. pt. 2, at 136, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C-A.N. 303, 419, echoing the report of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84-85
(1989).
87 H.R. RP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 70 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 445,
493 (emphasis added).
88 SeeDoe, 999 F. Supp. at 1193.
89 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN.
303, 419-20 (emphasis added); S. REP.No. 101-116, at 85 (1989) (emphasis added);
see also TEcHNrCAL AssisraNcsa MAruA, supra note 43, § 111-3.11000, at 19.
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In light of the reports offered by the various legislative committees, the Department of Justice (delegated by Congress with the authority to promulgate binding regulations implementing Title 11190)
concluded that the ADA "does not prohibit use of legitimate actuarial
considerations to justify differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance." 91 However, the legislative history clearly indicates that the ADA prohibits differential treatment that is not based
on legitimate actuarial principles or reasonably anticipated experience. "This legislation assures that decisions concerning the insurance of persons with disabilities which are not based on bona fide risk
classification be made in conformity with non-discrimination
'92
requirements.
Thus, as Doe and Smith asserted, it seems Mutual may limit coverage for the treatment of AIDS or ARCs, provided that the limitations
are based on sound actuarial principles or actual or reasonably anticipated experience. 93 The circuit court in Doe considered this interpretation, however, and concluded that it was not correct. 94 "If it were,"
the court reasoned, "it would imply that section 302 (a) regulates the
content not only of insurance policies but also of all other products
and services, since the section is not limited to insurance." 95 Yet, such
is the case. Section 302(a) regulates the content of all products and
services "to the extent possible with such [limitations on the Act] as may
be required by the Act and these regulations." 96 Presumably the court
reasoned that section 302 (a) could not regulate the content of all
other goods and services because if it did, it would not provide for the
rule that the Act does not require the alteration of inventories to include special goods accommodating to the disabled. However, the
rule concerning the alteration of inventories is one of the limitations
on Title III provided for in the Act and the DOJ's regulations (and, as
we have seen, 97 does not apply to insurance policies).
In rejecting the contention that Mutual's AIDS caps must be
based on sound actuarial principles, the court further reasoned that
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994); see also supra note 83 (discussing deference
accorded to the DOJ's regulations).
91 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 619 (1996).
92

H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 138 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,

421.
93 See Bonnie Milstein et al., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A BreathtakingPromise for People with Mental Disabilities,24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240, 1243 (1991).

94 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 562.
95 Id.
96 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 609 (1996) (emphasis added); see also text accompanying supra note 84.
97 See supra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
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"the insurance industry... may have obtained the rule of construction in section 501(c) just to backstop its argument that section
302 (a) regulates only access and not content."98 Indeed, it seems the
insurance industry did press that interpretation upon the Department
of Justice while the DOJ was drafting its regulations. Appendix B to
the DOJ's regulations states, "[A] few commentators argued that the
Act does not apply to insurance underwriting practices or the terms of
insurance contracts." 9 9 However, the DOJ rejected that argument,
concluding instead,
Language in the committee reports indicates that Congress intended to reach insurance practices by prohibiting differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance offered by public
accommodations unless the differences are justified. "Under the
ADA, a person with a disability cannot be denied insurance or be
subject to different terms or conditions of insurance based on disability

alone, if the disability does not pose increased risks." 10°

The circuit court noted that the DOJ's regulations implementing
the ADA are entitled to Chevron deference, 10 1 which asks "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."'0 2 However, the court concluded that the DOJ's regulations did
not compel the interpretation offered by Doe and Smith largely because the examples provided by the DOJ's regulations and the committee reports only include instances of insurance companies refusing
to sell insurance to disabled persons and not of insurance companies
discriminating in the content of their policies. 10 3 Moreover, both the
Judiciary report and the DOJ's regulations provide in their examples
that an insurance company may offer policies that limit coverage for
certain procedures or treatments but may not entirely deny coverage
to a person with a disability. 10 4 However, when read in the context of
the preceding language, it becomes apparent that an insurance company may limit coverage for certain treatments, but only if such limita98 Doe 179 F.3d at 562.
99 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 619 (1996).
100 Id. (quoting H.R. RE,. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 303, 419, and S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84 (1989)) (emphasis added).
While AIDS certainly poses increased risks, the legislative history indicates that insurance companies must apply actuarial principles in weighing those risks to determine
reasonable coverage limits for persons with AIDS.
101 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 563 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998)).
102 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
103 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 562-63.
104 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 494; 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 619.
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tion is based on sound actuarial principles or reasonably anticipated
10 5
experience.
It is curious, however, that in its regulations and Technical Assistance Manual the Department of Justice does "not indicate a focused
attention to coverage limits.' u 0 6 In fact, before the DOJ issued the

regulations, many commentators argued that section 501 (c) of the Act
did not give enough protection to disabled persons, 0 7 yet the DOJ
decided to adopt the language of the rule unchanged. 10 8
Still, while the regulations and legislative history do not specifically address coverage limits, neither do they explicitly limit application of the anti-discrimination provisions to questions of access. The
regulations do specifically address other limitations on Tile III's
scope; note for example the limitations regarding the alteration of
inventories and those allowing medical specialists to refuse to treat
illnesses outside of their specialty. 0 9 However, the regulations do not
specifically restrict Title III from applying to the content of insurance
policies, an interpretation that would contradict much of the language in the committee reports forbidding insurance companies from
discriminating against persons with disabilities "in the terms or conditions of insurance"" 0 and prohibiting insurance companies from
"limit[ing] the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an
individual""' based on disability unless the limitation is based on
sound actuarial principles or reasonably anticipated experience.
Furthermore, while the circuit court in Doe labeled as a "radical
stance" the interpretation that the ADA requires insurance companies
to base their coverage limitations on legitimate actuarial considerations, such an interpretation is consistent with the stated purpose of
the Act. "It is the purpose of [the ADA] to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
105 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419-20; id. pt. 3, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. 445, 494; S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989).
106 Doe, 179 F.3d at 563.
107 See 28 G.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 619 ("The Department received numerous comments on proposed § 36.212 [implementing section 501(c)]. Most supported the
proposed regulation but felt that it did not go far enough in protecting individuals
with disabilities and persons associated with them from discrimination.").
108 See id.
109 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
110 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
419; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84 (1989).
111 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 137 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.G.A.N. 303,
420; id. pt. 3, at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 445, 494; S. REP. No. 101116, at 85 (1989).
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against individuals with disabilities,"" 2 and "to bring those individuals
into the economic and social mainstream of American life."" 3 In
light of the purpose of the ADA, it seems an interpretation limiting
the Act's application to questions of access would be far more narrow
than the alternative interpretation would be "radical." Indeed, restricting the ADA's purview to mere access to goods and services
would affirmatively undermine the goals of the Act 1 14 As the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia noted, "Because
access to adequate health care is often integral to a disabled individual's ability to participate in society, the court cannot imagine that an
insurer could arbitrarily cap the benefits payable with respect to a particular disability without running afoul of this stated purpose.""15 Persons with AIDS in particular are widely ostracized from the
mainstream of American society because AIDS is so often associated
with homosexuality and drug use."16 Allowing coverage limits for
AIDS treatments to be based on speculation and not on legitimate
actuarial considerations perpetuates the marginalization of persons
with AIDS in American society in direct contradiction of the stated
purpose of the ADA.
Therefore, the language of the statute, the committee reports,
the regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice, and the
stated purpose of the ADA all suggest that Title III should prohibit
discrimination in the content of insurance policies. Though neither
the statute nor the regulations specifically address their application to
112
113

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 445,

446; see also Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 933, 26

WEEKLY

COMp. PRrs. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 601, 602 ("[The
ADA] signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with
disabilities from the mainstream of American life.").
114 For a thorough analysis of the ADA's goals and potential implications, see Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991).

115 World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997), vacated as
moot, 156 F.3d 1142 (1lth Cir. 1998); see also Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950
F. Supp. 422, 427 (1996) ("[I]t is often insurance coverage that will determine a disabled person's ability to prevent the disability from limiting his or her participation in
society." (quoting Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 192-93 (6th Cir.),
reh ken ban granted and vacated, 107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1996), rehk en banc, 121 F.3d

1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998)); Milstein, supra note 93, at
1243 (discussing difficulties that health insurance poses for individuals with
disabilities).
116 See Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein, Introduction to AIDS AGENDA:
EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS, at xi (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds.,
1992); JFR

A.I
MELLO, AIDS AND THE LAW OF WORmLACE DISCRIMINATION 1 (1995).
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coverage limitations, the committee reports indicate that Congress
did not intend to completely relieve the insurance industry of its duty
to refrain from discriminating against disabled policy holders.
Rather, insurance companies must base any differential treatment of
persons with disabilities on legitimate actuarial considerations and not
on speculation.
However, regardless of whether Mutual's AIDS caps violate the
anti-discrimination provisions of Title III, Mutual may still escape liability if the application of the ADA to Mutual's policies is barred by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
IL

DOES THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT BAR APPLICATION OF THE
ADA TO INSURANCE POICIES?

The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel in Doe concluded that
regardless of whether the ADA regulates the content of insurance policies, the suit brought by Doe and Smith had to fail because it was
barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.11 7 Section 2 (b) of that Act forbids construing any federal statute "to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . .unless such Act specifically relates to the busi-

ness of insurance."1 18 Thus, to escape preclusion by the McCarranFerguson Act and come to bear on a case involving the business of
insurance, a federal statute either (1) must not "invalidate, impair, or
supercede" a state law enacted to regulate the business of insurance or
(2) must "specifically relate" to the business of insurance.1 19 Contrary
117

See Doe, 179 F.3d at 563. More precisely, the court said,
We conclude that section 302(a) does not require a seller to alter his
product to make it equally valuable to the disabled and to the nondisabled,
even if the product is insurance.... And if [this conclusion] is wrong, the
suit must fail anyway, because it is barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Id. Given the court's qualification of its conclusion regarding the applicability of
§ 302 (a) to the content of insurance policies, this conclusion could be regarded as
mere dicta.
118 McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
119 Of course, just what constitutes "the business of insurance" is often at issue in
cases implicating the McCarran-Ferguson Act. However, that issue does not present
itself in the context of Doe inasmuch as the conduct at issue, the provision of insurance policies with potentially discriminatory policy caps, clearly constitutes "the business of insurance." Both the district court and the court of appeals in Doe made that
assumption, and the relevant case law supports it. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393
U.S. 453, 460 (1969) ("The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of
policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement-these
[are] the core of the 'business of insurance.'... Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this [policyholder-insurer] relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws regulat-
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to the circuit court's holding in Doe, the anti-discrimination provisions
of the ADA meet both of those requirements, and the McCarran-Ferguson Act should not bar their application to insurance policies.
A.

To "Invalidate,Impair, or Supersede"

If a federal statute does not specifically relate to the insurance
business, the McCarran-Ferguson Act prohibits construing the act "to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance." 120 By its very terms
then, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar application of a federal statute to the business of insurance if the statute does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" any state law regulating insurance. 12' The
district court in Doe concluded that Mutual did "not identif[y] any
state law that an application of Tide III of the ADA would 'invalidate,
impair, or supersede.'"122 In fact, Illinois insurance law would have
had the same effect on the business of insurance that Title III of the
ADA would have had if the ADA were applied to the content of insurance policies. According to Illinois law,
No company, in any policy of accident or health insurance issued in
this State, shall make or permit any distinction or discrimination
against individuals solely because of handicaps or disabilities... in
the amount of any dividends or other benefits payable thereon, or
in any other terms and conditions of the contract it makes, except
where the distinction or discrimination is based on sound actuarial
principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated
experience. 123
The district court in Doe interpreted section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to mean that "[w]here there is no conflict between
the federal statute and state law, as in this case, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar application of federal law."' 24 Indeed, the
court's conclusion was well supported by several circuit court rulings

ing the 'business of insurance.'"); see also Julia M. Melendez, The McCarran-Ferguson
INS. & CORP.COUNSEL Q. 283, 290-92 (1992).
120 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
121 See Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 303 (1999); Murff v. Professional
Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1996); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.v. Cisneros,
52 F.3d 1351, 1360-61 (6th Cir. 1995).
122 Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1195-96.

Act: Has It Outlived Its Intent?, 42 FED'N

123 215 ILL. CoMw.

STAT.

5/364 (West 1993).

124 Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1196.
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from the previous few years including one of the Seventh Circuit's. 125
Accordingly, the district court ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
126
did not preclude application of Title III to insurance policies.
However, the court of appeals in Doe rejected the district court's
analysis, noting that a federal statute need not directly conflict with a
state law designed to regulate insurance in order to trigger the prohibitive effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.127 It is enough, the circuit court maintained, if the interpretation of the federal statute
would "interfere with a state's administrative regime."'128 In support,
the court cited Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, decided by the Supreme Court
just six months before.' 29 In Humana, the Supreme Court held that
because the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO) advanced the State of Nevada's interest in combating insurance fraud and did not frustrate any articulated Nevada policy, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar insurance policy beneficiaries
from suing a group health insurer and hospital under RICO. 130
In determining whether suit under RICO would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" relevant Nevada law, the Supreme Court considered definitions of the three relevant terms. 13 1 The Court quickly
concluded that application of RICO would not "invalidate" or "supersede" Nevada law regulating insurance because, to do so under the
125 See id. (citing Cisneros,52 F.3d at 1363, Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v.
Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1491-93 (9th Cir. 1995), and NAACP v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 295-97 (7th Cir. 1992)).

126 See id.
127 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 563.
128 Id. (citing Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999)).
129 See id. The opinion also cites the following two cases for support: Department of
the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993), and Autry v. Northwest Premium Services, Inc.,

144 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1998). However, neither of these cases contain any reference
to such a standard, nor did they address the issue of whether the federal statutes in
question "invalidate, impair, or supersede" the relevant state statutes. See Fabe, 508
U.S. at 501.
The parties agree that application of the federal priority statute would
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" the Ohio priority scheme and that the federal priority statute does not "specifically relat[e] to the business of insurance." All that is left for us to determine, therefore, is whether the Ohio
priority statute is a law enacted "for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance."
Id. (alteration in original); see also, Auty, 144 F.3d at 1044 (holding that the relevant
state statute was not enacted for the purpose of regulating insurance and that there
was no need for the court to determine whether the federal statute invalidated, impaired, or superseded it).
130 See Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 314 (1999).
131 See id. at 307-10.

200o]

COMMENT:

DOE v. MUTUAL

OF OMAHA

ordinary definitions of the words, RICO would have to render the Nevada law "ineffective."' 3 2 Likewise, application of Title III of the ADA
to insurance policies would not "render ineffective"' 33 the applicable
Illinois law, inasmuch as litigants would still have recourse to that law
in Illinois court. Hence, the key question before the Supreme Court
in Humana,and before the Seventh Circuit in Doe, was whether application of the relevant federal statute would "impair" the state law reg34
ulating insurance.
In resolving the question, the Supreme Court in Humana articulated a "formulation [that] seem[ed] to [it] to capture the meaning
and to construe, most sensibly, the text of § 2(b)" of the McCarranFerguson Act.' 3 5 According to that formulation, "[w] hen federal law
does not directly conflict with state regulation, and when application
of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a State's administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson
13 6
Act does not preclude its application."
Clearly application of Title III of the ADA to insurance policies
would not conflict with state regulation of insurance and would not
frustrate any declared state policy, because Illinois has itself enacted a
law that would provide for the same or greater protection of disabled
persons against discrimination by insurance companies. 137 At issue
then is whether application of Title III of the ADA to insurance policies would "interfere with a state's administrative regime." This was
the sole standard on which the circuit court in Doe relied in determining that application of Title Ill to insurance policies would impair illinois's regulation of insurance and trigger preclusion by the
38
McCarran-Ferguson Act.'
The Supreme Court articulated the standard prohibiting interference with a state's administrative regime for the first time in
Humana.3 9 However, the Court did not explain how application of a
federal statute to the business of insurance might interfere with a
state's administrative regime. The Court in Humana ruled that the
plaintiffs' suit under RICO in that case did not "impair" state regula132 Id. at 307-08.
133 Id. at 307.
134 See id. at 308.
135 Id. at 310.
136 Id.
137 For the text of the statute, see 215 hiL. Coup.
also supra text accompanying note 123.
138 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 563-64.
139 See Humana, 525 U.S. at 303.

STAT.

5/364 (West 1993) and see
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tion of insurance-that is, it did not frustrate any state policy or inter1 40
fere with the state's administrative regime.
Unfortunately, Humana does not answer the precise question
raised in Doe. In Humana, the Supreme Court decided the question
of whether application of a federal law that proscribes the same conduct as a state law, but which provides materially different remedies,
would "impair" the state law.141 Doe presents the question of whether
a federal statute that requires a court to determine whether insurance
coverage limits are consistent with sound actuarial principles "impairs" state law by causing interference with the state's administrative
regime.
The circuit court in Doe presumed that application of the ADA to
the content of insurance policies would require federal courts to determine whether coverage limits were consistent with sound actuarial
principles and state law before it determined whether an insurance
company had violated the ADA. 142 It is this construction of the
ADA-"requiring a federal court to decide whether an insurance policy is consistent with state law"'143-that the circuit court in Doe ruled
"obviously would interfere with the administration of the state law." 144
However, the anti-discrimination requirements of Title III of the
ADA would not necessarily require a federal court to determine
whether coverage limits are consistent with state law. Were the general anti-discrimination requirement contained in section 302 (a) of
Title III of the ADA to apply to the content of insurance policies, that
140 See id. at 311. The defendants had argued that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
barred the policy beneficiaries' suit under RICO against their insurance company for
insurance fraud because RICO's private remedies and treble damages provision exceeded Nevada's administrative penalties for the crime. See id. at 304-05. However,
the Supreme Court held that the application of RICO did not "impair" state regulation of insurance since Nevada law also provided for a private right of action and
plaintiffs could be eligible for damages exceeding the treble damages available under
RICO. See id. at 311-13.
141 See id. at 303.
142 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.

143 Id.
144 Id. Dissenting from the majority's opinion in Doe, Judge Evans points out that
"the question of whether these caps are actuarially sound or consistent with state law
has been taken out of the equation by Mutual of Omaha's concession in the parties'
stipulation." Id. at 566 (Evans, J., dissenting). Mutual had stipulated that it "has not

shown and cannot show that its AIDS Caps are or ever have been consistent with
sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience, bona fide risk
classification, or state law." Id. at 558. However, as the majority noted, the court

would be "certain to be called upon to decide such issues in the next case, when the
insurer does not stipulate to them." Id. at 564. Though such a rationale may not
justify the decision in Doe, it warrants consideration of the issue in this Comment.
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section would prohibit inferior policy provisions for the disabled, such
as lower coverage limits, unless such provisions were based on sound
actuarialprinciplesor actual orreasonably anticipatedexperience.1 45 Section
302 (a) does not require federal courts to ensure that insurance policy
provisions comport with principles of state law. Thus, application of
Title I of the ADA to the content of insurance policies would not
interfere with a state's administrative regime and would not "impair"
state law for the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Since application of Title III of the ADA to the content of insurance policies would not "invalidate, impair, or supersede" Illinois law
regulating insurance, the McCarran-Ferguson Act should not bar its
application in Doe. However, whether application of the ADA to insurance policies would interfere with state law regulating insurance depends on the state laws in question. Thus, federal courts would have
to determine the issue on a case-by-case basis. If, however, Title III of
the ADA "specifically relates" to the business of insurance, then it falls
within the scope of the explicit exception to preclusion provided for
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and applies to the content of insurance
policies in all cases and in all states.
B.

Title III "Specifically Relates" to the Business of Insurance

The circuit court in Doe concluded that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act barred the application of Title III to insurance because Title III
did not fall within the "specifically relates" exception of the McCarranFerguson Act.' 4 6 In reaching this conclusion, however, the court confused the issues of whether the ADA impairs state law, on the one
hand, and whether the ADA specifically relates to insurance, on the
other.
As the district court in Doe concluded, the relevant anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA do specifically relate to the business of
insurance. 14 7 Section 501 (c) of Title IV of the ADA expressly provides
that insurance underwriting practices "shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [Title 11]. '"148 Moreover, Title III explicitly includes "insurance office" in its definition of public
accommodation such that the general anti-discrimination clause contained in section 302(a) applies to insurance companies. 149 These
specific references to the business of insurance suffice to preserve the
145
146
147
148
149

See supra notes 85-113 and accompanying text.
See Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.
See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1195.
Americans with Disabilities Act § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12187(7) (F) (1994); see also supra note 24.
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ADA's application to insurance companies from the preclusive effect
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The United States Supreme Court analyzed the "specifically relates" exception in Barnett Bank v. Nelson.15 0 There the Court considered whether a federal statute granting national banks in small towns
the authority to sell insurance preempted Florida state law prohibiting
the same. The Court determined that the federal statute specifically
relates to the business of insurance within the meaning of the exception to the McCarran-Ferguson Act and rested its conclusion on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's language and purpose. 5 1 Considering the
language "specifically relates to the business of insurance," the Court
noted, "The word 'relates' is highly general, and this Court has interpreted it broadly in other pre-emption contexts." 52 The Court concluded, "In ordinary English, a statute that says that banks may act as
insurance agents, and that the Comptroller of the Currency may regulate their insurance-related activities, 'relates' to the insurance business." 153 Likewise, a statute that says an insurer shall not use
otherwise legitimate practices of underwriting, classifying, or administering risks to evade the purposes of the ADA "relates" to the insur54
ance business.'
The Court further noted that, according to Black's Law Dictionary,
the word, "specifically" could mean "'explicitly, particularly, [or] definitely,' . .. thereby contrasting a specific reference with an implicit reference made by more general language to a broader topic." 15 5 The
Court explained, "The general words 'business activity,' for example,
will sometimes include, and thereby implicitly refer ...to insurance;
the particular words 'finance, banking, and insurance' make that reference explicitly and specifically."' 56 By analogy, then, the terms "an
insurer"1 5 7 and "insurance office" 158 used by the ADA refer explicitly
and specifically to insurance.
Finally, the Court in Barnett Bank considered the meaning of
"business of insurance." 59 The Court concluded that the federal stat150 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
151 See id. at 38.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
155 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 38 (quoting BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 1398 (6th ed.
1990)).
156 Id. at 38-39.
157 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
158 Id. § 12181(7)(F) (1994).
159 See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 39; see also supra note 119.
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ute in question specifically relates to the "business of insurance" because it affected the "relation of insured to insurer and the spreading
of risk-matters that this Court, in other contexts, has placed at the
core of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's concern."' 60 Section 501 (c) of
Title IV of the ADA also specifically addresses those spreading of riskmatters that constitute the "business of insurance." That section states
that the ADA does not prohibit insurers "from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law,"' 6 1 provided, however, that insurers do not
use those exempted underwriting practices to evade the purposes of
62
the ADA.'
The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel in Doe conceded that
section 501 (c) of Title IV of the ADA specifically relates to insurance
and thus is not itself within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. 163 However, the court maintained that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act barred application of the anti-discrimination provisions of Title III
to the insurance industry. The court reasoned that because it is the
anti-discrimination provision of section 302 (a) of Tide II that "injects
the federal courts into the heart of the regulation of the insurance
business by the states,"' 64 (and not section 501 (c)) it is section 302 (a)
that must fall within the "specifically relates" exception of the McCar165
ran-Ferguson Act if it is to apply to insurance companies.
As noted above, however, Title III explicitly includes "insurance
office" in its definition of public accommodation. 166 Thus, in prohibiting discrimination against individuals on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services offered by places
of public accommodation, 167 section 302 (a) specifically prevents such
discrimination by insurance companies. 168 Moreover, section 302(a)
specifically relates to "the business of insurancd'because the provision of
insurance policies to policy-holders is the essence of the "relation of
insured to insurer" that constitutes the "business of insurance" as defined by the Supreme Court. 1 69 Yet, the circuit court rejected the ar160 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 39.
161 Americans with Disabilities Act § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).

162

See id.

163
164
165

See Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.
Id.
See id.

166 See 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7) (F) (1994).
167 See id. § 12182(a) (1994).
168 See supra note 24.
169 See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996); see also SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393
U.S. 453, 460 (1969); supranote 117 (quoting NationalSecurities, Inc., 393 U.S. at 460).
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gument that Title III falls within the "specifically relates" exception to
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and that, therefore, the McCarran-Fergu1 70
son Act should not bar the application of Title III to insurance.
The court's reasoning for rejecting the argument, however, is fundamentally flawed.
The majority opinion conceded that "section 302 (a) has some application to insurance: it forbids an insurer to turn down an applicant
merely because he is disabled. To that extent... we can accept (certainly for the purposes of argument) that section 302 (a) relates specifically to the business of insurance.' 7 1 The court continued,
But thus limited to a simple prohibition of discrimination, section
302 (a) does not impair state regulation of insurance; no state wants
insurance companies to refuse to insure disabled people. It is only
when section 302 (a) is interpreted as broadly as it must be for the
plaintiffs in this case to prevail that McCarran-Ferguson's reverse
172
preemption comes into play.
The court here confused the issues of whether application of section 302(a) to insurance will "impair" state regulation of insurance, on
the one hand, and whether section 302 (a) "specifically relates" to the
business of insurance, on the other. If section 302(a) specifically relates to the business of insurance, then whether section 302 (a) impairs state regulation of insurance is irrelevant. 173 The circuit court
accepted that section 302(a) specifically relates to the business of insurance insofar as section 302 (a) only prohibits discriminatory denials
of access to insurance, 1 74 but it denied that section 302 (a) specifically
relates to insurance if that section is to be interpreted as regulating
the content of insurance policies. What the court failed to appreciate
is that if section 302 (a) specifically relates to the business of insurance, then it does so regardless of whether the section regulates the
content of insurance policies or merely access to them. Because, as
the court here conceded, section 302(a) specifically relates to the
business of insurance-at least to the extent that it prohibits discriminatory denials of access to insurance- 7 5-then it relates to the business
of insurance even if section 302 (a) regulates the content of insurance
policies as well. Thus, the McCarran-Ferguson Act should not bar its
application in Doe.
170
171

See Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.
Id.

172

Id.

173
Med.
174
175

See Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 303 (1999); Murff v. Professional
Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1996).
See Doe, 179 F.3d at 564.
See id.
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This conclusion is also consistent with the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act-namely, that because continued regulation of the
insurance industry by the states is in the public interest, "silence on
the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier
176
to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States."
As the Supreme Court in BarnettBank explained, this stated purpose,
particularly the word 'silence,' indicates that the Act does not seek
to insulate state insurance regulation from the reach of all federal
law. Rather, it seeks to protect state regulation primarily against inadvertentfederal intrusion-say, through enactment of a federal statute that describes an affected activity in broad, general terms,
of
177
which the insurance business happens to constitute one part.
The effect of the ADA on the insurance industry-that is, the prohibition of discrimination by insurance companies against individuals
with disabilities-is not inadvertent. The ADA specifically addresses
the business of insurance and intentionally draws it within the scope
of its anti-discrimination provisions. The Court also explained,
Neither the McCarran-Ferguson Act's language, nor its purpose, requires the Federal Statute to relate predominately to insurance. To
the contrary, specific detailed references to the insurance industry
in proposed legislation normally will achieve the McCarran-Ferguson Act's objectives, for they will call the proposed legislation to the
attention of the interested parties, and thereby normally guarantee,
should the proposal become law, that Congress will have focused
upon its insurance-related effects.' 7 8
Thus, consideration of the language and purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act indicate that Title III of the ADA falls within the
"specifically relates" exception of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, as at
least one court of appeals has held since the Seventh Circuit decided
Doe.' 79 Therefore, contrary to the circuit court's conclusion in Doe,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act should not bar application of the ADA to
the business of insurance.

176 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994).; see also Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39
(1996).
177 Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 39.
178 Id. at 41-42.

179 See Pallozzi v. Allstate Lfe Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1999). But see
McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., No. 98-10585, 2000 WL 217500, at *6 (5th Cir. Feb. 24,
2000).
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DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT OF

AIDS

CAPs

In assessing the discriminatory effect of Mutual's AIDS caps, the
district court provided the following example: 8 0 Mutual will provide
up to $1,000,000 to non-disabled individuals for the treatment of
pneumonia; however, if pneumonia afflicts an individual as a complication of AIDS, the pneumonia is deemed an AIDS related condition
(ARC), and it becomes subject to the AIDS/ARC cap. Thus, if Richard Smith, who joined Doe in his suit against Mutual, had already exceeded his $25,000 limit for AIDS-related care, Mutual would deny
Smith coverage for the treatment of his pneumonia, while a non-disabled individual who had not reached the $1,000,000 benefit cap
181
would not be denied coverage.
The appellate court conceded that the difference in treatment
seemed to be "referable solely to the fact that one person is disabled
and the other not."' 82 However, the court rejected this conclusion,
reasoning that even when a person with AIDS and a person without
are struck with the same disease, because the disease is much more
lethal when it strikes a person with AIDS, it is "not really the same
disease."'183 By the circuit court's reasoning, then, a disease would not
really be the same if it struck an elderly person or a young child, because in each case the same disease would be much more lethal to
that person than to a young adult. Moreover, Judge Evans in dissent
noted that neither Mutual's policies nor the medical community have
84
established definitions for what "conditions" are "AIDS-related."
Thus, the very same affliction may be classified as both AIDS-related
and not AIDS-related. 18 5 As a result (and as Mutual conceded) "coverage for certain expenses would be approved or denied based solely on
86
whether the insured had AIDS.'1
There is, however, a deeper, more fundamental discriminatory
effect of Mutual's AIDS caps: such AIDS caps deny in persons with
AIDS the human dignity that Mutual recognizes and respects in persons who are not so disabled. Mutual's policies suggest that persons
disabled with AIDS do not warrant application of the same procedures
by which Mutual arrives at the policy caps of non-disabled individuals.
Whereas Mutual will determine the policy caps of non-disabled per180 See Doe, 999 F. Supp. at 1196.
181 See id.
182 Doe, 179 F.3d at 560.
183 Id. at 561.
184 See id. at 565 (Evans, J., dissenting).
185 See id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
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sons by application of actuarial principles or by reference to actual
experience with a non-disabled person's illness, Mutual will not take
the time to apply the same criteria to the determination of the policy
caps of those individuals afflicted with AIDS. Implicit in such discriminatory practice is the principle that because a person has contracted
the virus that causes AIDS, that person does not deserve the same effort, time, or expense on the part of Mutual in determining appropriate benefit caps for that person's insurance policy. Rather, Mutual
can resort to raw speculation or simply apply an arbitrary figure in
setting the cap on the amount of money it will provide to a person
with AIDS for that person's AIDS related treatment.
CONCLUSION

The discrimination effected by Mutual's AIDS caps is blatantly antithetical to the stated purpose of the ADA. The ADA purports to
signal a "clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."1 87 "The
common sense of the statute,"'8 8 to borrow a phrase from the majority's opinion in Doe, suggests that a "comprehensive" national mandate to "eliminate" discrimination against individuals with disabilities
should not provide for protection up to the point of sale of an insurance policy and then excuse discrimination in the terms and conditions of that policy. Because the plain language of the ADA does not
limit its application to mere access to insurance policies, and because
to do so would directly contradict the stated purpose of the Act, and
lastly, because the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar application of
Tite I of the ADA to the content of insurance policies, Tite III
should so apply.
As the rule articulated by the majority in Doe now stands, however, the protection afforded by the ADA runs only so far as the sales
counter in an insurance office. Essentially, so long as Mutual, or any
other insurance company, allows individuals with disabilities a place
on its bus, the insurance company may seat them anywhere it wants.
And so long as Doe is the law in the Seventh Circuit, the insurance
companies will seat them in the back.

.187
188

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
Doe, 179 F.3d at 560.
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